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The reasons for the strong rise in the securitization phenomenon up until the start of the “subprime
crisis” need to be analysed. According to many authors, they mainly stem from its offering the possi-
bility of generating ﬁxed yield securities with the highest rating and a low risk premium, thanks to the
issues being structured in differentiated bond series, so that certain series absorb most of the risk, thus
facilitating the safer or “senior” tranches having a higher rating. Accordingly, this paper reviews the
literature on the factors underlying the generation of differentiated tranches in this type of issues and21
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regarding the determining factors of the yield offered by securitization issues. It concludes that the search
for more complete markets, along with the reducing of problems associated to the moral hazard, are the
main reasons for the multi-tranche structuring. And given the strong inﬂuence of the number of tranches
on the yield offered by the issues, the paper likewise concludes that the multitranche structures has been
an efﬁcient tool to place securitization issues with more competitive yields.
© 2015 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
Over two decades up until the onset of the subprime crisis,
nternational ﬁnancial markets witnessed a spectacular develop-
ent of asset-backed securitization, both in terms of volume and
ethods, to the point that it became the most powerful
nd dynamic means of ﬁnancial innovation. The relevance of
ecuritization can be seen both from a quantitative and qualita-
ive perspective. The immense majority of the securitization bonds
hus received maximum ratings (AAA), not only during, but also
fter the period prior to the crisis. In the years in the run up to the
risis, securitization issues worldwide represented over two thirds
f AAA issues overall (BCBS, 2011). It is precisely the opportunity
ffered by securitization to generate ﬁxed-yield securities with the
aximumrating (and, consequently,withavery lowriskpremium)
hich explains, to a great extent, its intensive use, and, to a lesser
xtent, why many agents, particularly credit institutions, continue
o do.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: miguelangel.pena@ehu.es (M.Á. Pen˜a-Cerezo).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iedee.2015.08.001
444-8834/© 2015 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).There is, therefore, clearly no doubt about the social and eco-
nomic relevance of securitization. Beyond the discussion regarding
this mechanism’s contribution to the triggering of the subprime
crisis, from the point of view of the academic and scientiﬁc
interest generated by its use, there is not a great deal of research
that focusesonanalysing theyieldprovidedby the securities result-
ing from securitization, even though there are numerous studies
that point to its characteristic as a means to obtain ﬁnancing on
good terms as the fundamental reason for its development. More-
over, to the best of our knowledge, none of those studies performed
an exhaustive review of the related literature.
Given these gaps in the literature, we believe it to be
appropriate to delve further into the aspects most closely related
to the use of securitization: borrowing on advantageous terms
and the factors that made it possible. In this regard, the gen-
eration of issues where the majority of the securitization bonds
had maximum ratings was based on ﬂexibility associated to this
ﬁnancial technique. This enabled the issues to be structured on
various differentiated series of subordinated securities (tranches),
meaning that certain subordinated tranches (or equity) absorb the
majority of the risk and freeing their privileged tranches (or senior
tranches), thus facilitating their higher rating. Precisely for that
reason, the central purpose of this paper is to identify the factors
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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nderlying the generation of differentiated tranches in securiti-
ation issues (tranching) and the impact of these multi-tranche
tructures, and other relevant factors, on the primary yield offered
y the securitization bonds. This will be carried out by a review
f both the theoretical and empirical literature existing in that
egard.
Consequently, this paper is structured in the following three
ections. The next section reviews the factors that inﬂuence the
eneration of multi-tranche structures, considering both the ﬁnan-
ial theory approaches and the results of the empirical studies
onducted in that regard. The factors are then analysed that, along
ith those structures, impact the primary yield of the securitiza-
ion issues. The paper ends by setting out the main conclusions
btained.
. Generating multi-tranche structures: determinants
The literature puts forward many reasons for using securiti-
ation. However, obtaining ﬁnancing on attractive terms appears
he most recurrent, if not the most relevant, of such reasons.
his conclusion is not only reached based on quantitative studies
Agostino & Mazzuca, 2009; Bannier & Hänsel, 2008; Cardone-
iportella, Samaniego-Medina, & Trujillo-Ponce, 2010; Gorton &
etrick, 2012), but also on more qualitative approaches (BCBS,
011). However, there are few papers that focus on analysing the
ield offered by the securitization bonds; moreover, none of them
erform an integral review of the different types of variables that
ay affect that yield, by linking them to the different ﬁnancial
heories.
Therefore, we aim to delve further into the factors that justify
he development of securitization as a mechanism to obtain low-
ost ﬁnancing, with a special emphasis on the internal structure of
he securitization funds, an essential factor that distinguishes this
ype of issues from other ﬁnancing mechanisms.
The fact that a single asset pool acts as collateral or guaran-
ee to a structure or set of a series of bonds (tranches), with a
redetermined order of precedence and, therefore, with different
isk proﬁles, allows the needs of investors with different proﬁles
o be met, which results in a lower overall return requirement
y investors. Consequently, the design of the number and size of
he tranches seeks to minimise the weighted sum of the yields
fferedby the seriesof bonds intowhicheach securitization issueor
emand is divided (Childs, Ott, & Riddiough, 1996; Franke&Weber,
009).
Firla-Cuchra (2005) andFirla-Cuchraand Jenkinson (2006)high-
ight three main reasons to explain the multi-tranche structuring
tranching) and its impact on the yield of the issues: (i) the sophis-
ication of the investors, (ii) the segmentation of the markets and
iii) the existence of asymmetric information. However, the inﬂu-
nce of those three factors cannot be perfectly deﬁned and each
ne of them will be considered separately below.
.1. Sophistication of the markets and of investors
One of the circumstances associated to the greater complexity
f the structuring of the securitization operations is the degree of
ophistication of the markets and of the investors involved. Both
he improved risk analysis techniques and the advances in infor-
ation technology are two of the main factors that have explained
he growth of securitization (European Commission, 2004) and the
reater sophistication of the investors were placed among the six
ost important factors.
Plantin (2004) indicates that the growing sophistication of
he investors should be associated to the generation of issues
tructured on a greater number of tranches and with greater dif-
erentiation of the roles performed by the participating agents. Inent and Business Economics 22 (2016) 111–116
this regard, the model proposed by this author propounds that
the issuers should be interested in generating at least two dif-
ferent types of bonds: on the one hand, the relatively high yield
generators, whose associated cash ﬂows are information sensitive;
they would be aimed at sophisticated agents and “scrutineers”,
with a greater yield compensating those analysis and supervision
endeavours; and, on the other hand, high quality bonds, close to
safe-haven assets, whose cash ﬂows are not information sensitive,
that is, which do not depend (or only to a minimum degree) on the
management by the issuers themselves; those securities would be
aimed at risk adverse and not very sophisticated investors.
Cumming, Schwienbacher, and McCahery (2011), in a world-
wide study of securitization issues underwritten by syndicated
loans, consider the generation of tranches as a core element for
the efﬁcient legal conﬁguration of this type of issues. They pro-
pose (and verify) that the investor protection and legal differences,
by countries, are decisive in the multi-tranche structuring. On the
contrary, Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010) believe that the regu-
lation of ﬁnancial systems is irrelevant in this regard, as the high
sophistication of the investors – or at least part of them – enable
agreements to be designed that cover the legal differences existing
betweencountriesbymeansof contractual clauses. Thiswould sup-
port the hypothesis that multi-tranche structuring is independent
from the existing legal framework for high sophisticated investors,
but not to no-sophisticated ones.
Some studies show the aforementioned relation between the
sophistication of the markets and the complexity of the securitiza-
tion structures. For the Spanish case, Pen˜a-Cerezo (2014) observes a
clearly positive relation between the degree of sophistication of the
investors and of the securitization markets (measured by the num-
ber, volume and types of funds set up) and the number of tranches
per issue. The European Commission (2004) came to similar con-
clusions using a more qualitative approach (focus group).
2.2. Segmentation and search for complete markets
The fact that ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, that is, that they
do not offer an exhaustive range of securities able to meet all the
needs of the investors, is a reason for the multi-tranche structuring
of the securitization issues (Franke & Weber, 2009). If the markets
are incomplete, the generation of new securities that cover the
needs not covered by the existing ones will be beneﬁcial (Firla-
Cuchra, 2005), as it helps to “complete” the markets, that is, to
extend the range of investment opportunities.
Therefore, according to this approach, the main virtue
associated to tranching lies in the order of precedence of the
different tranches. Thus, the simultaneous generation of particu-
larlyprotected tranches (senior) and subordinated tranches (known
as junior, mezzanine or – if they refer to those assuming the
ﬁrst losses – equity) is effective to complete the market and,
consequently, to minimise the mean yield linked to the issue
overall (Franke & Weber, 2009). In fact, if there are incomplete
markets and diverse investors as regards yield-risk preferences,
availability of private information or capacity to assess invest-
ments, the creation of multiple tranches with distinct characteris-
tics (different degrees of sensitivity to information, risk and yield)
may have the goal of adjusting the performance of the securitiza-
tion issues to the different investor proﬁles, thus completing the
market (Boot & Thakor, 1993; Gaur, Seshadri, & Subrahmanyam,
2004; Iacobucci & Winter, 2005; Plantin, 2004; Riddiough, 1997).
Thus, themost risk adverse investors, or those that ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
understand all the characteristics of this type of investments, may
prefer protected or senior tranche bonds. On the other hand, the
specialist investors may be more inclined to obtain an additional
yieldbyacquiringmore speciﬁc and information-sensitiveﬁnancial
assets, but also with greater risks. This reasoning is consolidated in
anagement and Business Economics 22 (2016) 111–116 113
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Table 1
Literature review: explanatory variables of the number of tranches in securitization
issues.
Study Sample/database Variables with signiﬁcant
effect on number of
tranches
Firla-Cuchra (2005)
and Firla-Cuchra
and Jenkinson
(2006)
European securitization
issues:
1987–2003/JP Morgan
Weighted average rating
(−), size (+), time dummies,
collateral dummies
Schaber (2008) European securitization
issues:
1987–2003/JP Morgan
Weighted average rating
(−), size (+), asset quality,
asymmetric information,
risk free interest rate (−)
Franke and Weber
(2009)
European CDO (169):
1997–2005/Moody’s Bank
Scope
Collateral quality (−), size
(+), portfolio diversiﬁcation
(−), equity tranche weight
(−), issue type, originators’
ROE (−), loans/collateral
ratio (+)
Pen˜a-Cerezo et al.
(2014)
Spanish MBS (94):
1996–2011/CNMV
Equity tranche weight (+),
weighted average rating
(−), size (+), risk free
interest rate (−)M.Á. Pen˜a-Cerezo et al. / European Research on M
ettings with a lack of liquidity, where it is not possible to carry out
perfect arbitration between assets with different characteristics
Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson, 2006; Gaur et al., 2004).
Therefore, investors with little capacity to analyse and manage
isks, or those that act as mere intermediaries (banks, conventional
nvestment funds, etc.) would opt to acquire safe-haven tranches,
ith a maximum rating, but little yield. Furthermore, certain insti-
utional investors are required, legally or statutorily, to limit their
ortfolio to ﬁnancial assets rated over a certain rating and, at times,
ay only acquire securities with the maximum rating. On the con-
rary, professional investors with a greater risk management and
nalysis capacity (hedge funds, funds managed by insurers, re-
nsurers, etc.)would prefer to invest in trancheswith a lower rating
nd greater yields (Plantin, 2004). In this regard, Franke and Weber
2009) establish a positive relation between the degree of hetero-
eneity of the investors and the generation of a greater number of
ranches, thus increasing the complexity of the markets, where, in
urn, the increase in thenumber of tranches is related to a reduction
n the requirement average yield.
On the other hand, the advantage arising from adjusting a large
umber of securitization bonds series to a greater diversity of
nvestors should offset the loss of liquidity from issuing smaller
olumes (DeMarzo, 2005;DeMarzo&Dufﬁe, 1999). Thus, the larger
ssues are the ones that best offset this loss of liquidity, while there
ould be less incentive for the smaller ones to be structured in a
igh number of series (DeMarzo, 2005; Mitchell, 2004). Schaber
2008) suggests that the existence of a segmented market, with
on-homogeneous investors in terms of their preferences or needs,
ust generate issueswith a greater number of tranches, to attract a
ore extensive investor base. Precisely, Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson
2006) use the size of the issue as proxy associated to the effects of
egmenting the market, propounding – and verifying, in the same
ay as Schaber (2008) and Franke and Weber (2009) subsequently
id – a positive relation between the size of the issue and the num-
er of tranches placed on the primary market.
However, Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2006) observe that the
argest issues certainly generate a large number of tranches (mar-
et classes), but not necessarily a larger number of tranches with
ifferent ratings (rating classes). In fact, the relation between size
nd number of tranches is stronger, when the market classes (the
eries generated, regardless of their rating) are taken into account
ather than the rating classes (the series generated with distinct
atings). This evidence strengthens the ideas of the tranching asso-
iated to the market segmentation, even at the cost of ex post loss
f liquidity.
In short, from the perspective of the issuer, the generation of
greater number of tranches enables a trade-off between: (i) the
eneﬁts arising from covering the needs of the different market
egments, and (ii) the ex post liquidity and transaction costs arising
rom the existence of smaller tranches.
On balance, the approaches associated to the segmentation of
he markets imply the existence of a positive relation between the
ize and number of tranches. Reviewing the empirical papers in
hat respect (Table 1) conﬁrms that relation, both for the Spanish
arket (Pen˜a-Cerezo, Rodríguez-Castellanos, & Ibán˜ez-Hernández,
014), and for European cases (Firla-Cuchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra &
enkinson, 2006; Franke & Weber, 2009).
.3. Asymmetric information
After the multi-tranche structuring, motivations can also be
ound relating to the problem solving arising from the existence
f information asymmetries among the originators–issuers (and
ncluding the brokers) and the ﬁnal investors. This is due to the
riginators of the assets being much more aware of their quality
han the potential investors at which the securitization issues are+/−: the variable has a positive/negative and relevant inﬂuence on the number of
tranches.
targeted. In turn, the pooling of a high number of assets in a single
portfolio, given that it hinders the scrutiny of the quality of those
credits and their monitoring, can worsen the problems associated
to the asymmetric information.
Therefore, the investors may suspect that they are being offered
“lemons” instead of good securities, and they will therefore be
reluctant to take themup (“adverse selection”). Yet the information
asymmetries not only come from thedifferent degree of knowledge
about the quality of the assets, but also from the difﬁculty that the
originators face to get across to investors their work of ex post cor-
rectly monitoring compliance of the obligations of the transferees
(“moral hazard”).
Consequently, the yield sought by the market can incorporate
a penalty for the problems arising both from the adverse selection
and from the moral hazard. Therefore, the granting of external or
internal guarantees is necessary on imperfect capital markets to
eliminate, or at least minimise, this problem. The “internal guaran-
tees” include multi-tranche structuring, as will be seen below.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) argue that the costs associated
to the existence of information asymmetries may be mitigated by
designing securities that segregate the cash ﬂows generated by the
underlying assets. Thegenerationof differentiated securitieswould
prevent, or would limit, such information asymmetries being used
by sophisticated institutions to achieve a brokerage beneﬁt at the
cost of non-sophisticated investors. That is, the generation of infor-
mation non-sensitive and safe securitization bonds – at the cost of
generating one or more subordinate tranches, that are information
sensitive – should prevent the agents with more information bene-
ﬁtting at the cost of the less informed. This risk reduction, achieved
by the senior bonds at the cost of the junior (or subordinate) ones,
would help to reduce the average differential requires for the secu-
ritization issues overall. The conclusion reached, both by means of
theoreticalmodelling and by empirical comparisons, is in this same
line: the optimum level of tranching is greater with information-
sensitive assets (Boot & Thakor, 1993; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson,
2006; Riddiough, 1997).
On the other hand, DeMarzo and Dufﬁe (1999) and DeMarzo
(2005) analyse the two opposing effects of the asset pooling: the
beneﬁcial diversiﬁcation of the risk and the harmful destruction
of information. They conclude that: (i) the originators will opt
for the pooled transfer of assets, given that the beneﬁt arising
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rom the diversiﬁcation and the ensuing reduction of the informa-
ionasymmetries is greater than their associated costs (information
estruction due to not transferring the credits individually), and (ii)
n sufﬁciently large portfolios, tranching can reduce the problems
ssociated to the information destruction arising from pooling.
However, the information problems associated to the
ssuer–investor relations can be reproduced as many times as
rokers acting on those markets. In this regard, not only is an
dverse selection problem generated associated to the mistrust
xisting between the investors and the brokers–bond issuers,
ut also there is a moral hazard issue linked to the possible mis-
lignment of incentives generated throughout the securitization
hain.
Those problems may arise at source, if there are credit institu-
ions with excessively expansive and unwise credit policies (Otero,
zcurra, Lado, & Durán, 2015; Otero, Ezcurra, Martorell, & Mulet,
013). In turn, the brokers, whose businessmay simply be based on
he volume of securities traded, and on monitoring and analysing
heir quality, may also adopt decisions that are not optimum in this
egard. Finally, the institutional investor, acting as the agent of the
rivate saver, may also incur this type of inefﬁciencies if they do
ot act with due diligence.
The moral hazard problems also arise from the logical mis-
rust that the investors may feel regarding the possibility
hat the originators have incentives to transfer lower quality assets
o the securitization fund, by keeping the relatively safer credits on
heir balance sheets (Plantin, 2004). Furthermore, with respect to
he consequences arising from more lax (or non-existent) super-
ision by the originator on the assets transferred, these will be
ore serious according to the more uncertain the cash ﬂows aris-
ng of those assets are, which is inversely related to the quality of
hose credits. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) detail the frictions
ssociated to information asymmetries in the securitization chain,
ndicating that, according to Moody’s, the quality of the manage-
ent carried out by the fund managers may inﬂuence up to 10% of
he real level of the losses.
Therefore, it is logical to expect that, the lower the quality of
he pool of transferred assets, the greater the potential costs will
e associated to the moral hazard that the originator may incur,
aken as being the possibility that it may carry out ex post actions
ontrary to the interests of the bondholders: changes in behaviour,
bsence of due diligence, etc. Following this reasoning, if the lower
uality of the portfolio of transferred assets makes the conse-
uences of the moral hazard more probable and/or more intense,
he securitization structures will have to offer more guarantees to
ffset that, particularly to the senior bondholders. Given that the
umber of tranches, along with the relative weight of the equity
ranche, is the main protective measures of the senior tranches, it
ust be concluded that a lower quality of the transferred credit
ortfolio will lead to a greater number of tranches.
In short, taking the moral hazard in perspective, the lower the
lobal quality of the asset pool is, the issue will be divided into
ore tranches, as compensation for the senior bondholders for
aking part in an issue underpinned by worse quality assets. A neg-
tive relation is therefore to be expected between the quality of
he pool of transferred assets and the number of tranches per issue
Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson, 2006; Franke & Weber, 2009; Schaber,
008).
However, the consideration of the adverse selection leads to a
ifferent approach. In fact, the generation of senior securitization
ond tranches, that are overprotected and aimed at investors that
emand safe securities, may reduce the undervaluation and the
ower liquidity that affect assets on a “market of lemons”. Given
hat the issuerswith better quality assets aremore impacted by the
osts arising from the possible adverse selection of the investors,
positive relation between the quality of the transferred assetsent and Business Economics 22 (2016) 111–116
and the number of tranches is to be expected, so that those issuers
manage to avoid or reduce the incentives for the adverse selected
by providing the investors with a broad and differentiated range of
investmentopportunities, even if thatmeans thegreater costs asso-
ciated to that more complex structure (Agarwal, Chang, & Yavas,
2012;An,Deng,&Gabriel, 2011; Franke,Herrmann,&Weber, 2007;
Iacobucci & Winter, 2005).
The empirical evidence found (Table 1) shows a negative rela-
tion between the quality of the issue and the number of tranches
(Firla-Cuchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson, 2006; Franke &
Weber, 2009; Pen˜a-Cerezoet al., 2014; Schaber, 2008), thusvalidat-
ing the models previously propounded by Boot and Thakor (1993)
and Riddiough (1997), based on the moral hazard, and therefore
contrary to what is argued by authors such as An et al. (2011) or
Agarwal et al. (2012). In short, the use of more complex multi-
tranche structure seems to be linked basically to the moral hazard
problem and not to the adverse selection one.
3. Yield of the securitization issues: determinants
As has been indicated in the previous section, the multitranche
structuring may not only foster the placing the senior tranches on
the market on the best terms, but it could also generate a reduc-
tion of the weighted average risk premium sought by the investors
for the tranches overall. In fact, this second consequence would be
what, if veriﬁed, would consolidate the real effectiveness of this
risk stratiﬁcation techniques as a net value generator, beyond the
internal risk transfer of some tranches (protected) to others (sub-
ordinated). Therefore, the effect of the tranching, along with other
variables, both on the yield sought for the senior tranches, and for
the weighted average yield of the issue, is a key research area.
The main explanatory variables considered in the studies aimed
at analysing the primary yield of the securitization issues are now
analysed.
First, a variable whose presence is very frequent in the rat-
ing granted to the securities issued, even when the complexity of
the issues is high (Firla-Cuchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson,
2006; Vink & Fabozzi, 2009; Vink & Thibeault, 2008a, 2008b).
Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the informationvaluepro-
vided by the average rating compared to other proxy variables of
the quality of the securitization bonds, such as the weight of poorer
quality tranches (mezzanine and equity)with regard to the total vol-
ume of the issue (Franke & Weber, 2009; Schaber, 2008; Vink &
Thibeault, 2008a, 2008b).
Thus, the number of credit rating agencies for each issue has
been considered as a possible quality measurement of the rating
awarded (Vink&Thibeault, 2008a, 2008b): the larger thenumberof
agencies implied, the lower the riskarising fromthe rating shopping,
taken to be choosing the agency that offers a more favourable
rating (Dittrich, 2007; Pen˜a-Cerezo, Rodríguez-Castellanos, &
Ibán˜ez-Hernández, 2013). Consequently, the expected value of the
coefﬁcient is negative, given that the greater the number of agen-
cies involved in rating the securitization issues, the more reliable
that rating will be and, therefore, the lower the margin offered.
The size of the issue is another of the variables considered (Firla-
Cuchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson, 2006; Franke & Weber,
2009; Schaber, 2008; Vink & Thibeault, 2008a, 2008b). Therefore,
it is reasonable to suppose the larger the pool of securitized assets,
the greater the degree of diversiﬁcation that will be achieved (geo-
graphically, by sectors, by income levels, etc.). Therefore the sign of
the relation existing between this variable (size) and the weighted
average yield of the bonds is expected to be negative. In turn,
the liquidity premium sought for smaller issuers will result in a
negative expected relation between the size and the yield offered
by the senior bond tranches,which aremore traded on themarkets.
anagement and Business Economics 22 (2016) 111–116 115
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Table 2
Literature review: explanatory variables of the securitization bonds yield.
Study Sample/database Variables with signiﬁcant
effect on securitization
bonds yield
Firla-Cuchra (2005)
and Firla-Cuchra
and Jenkinson
(2006)
European securitization
issues:
1987–2003/JP Morgan
Rating (−), size (−),
geographical and market
dummies, creditor’s rights
dummies, time dummies,
collateral dummies
Schaber (2008) European securitization
issues:
1987–2003/JP Morgan
Rating (−), size (−), risk
free interest rate (+), credit
enhancements (−)
Vink and Thibeault
(2008a)
765 non-US ABS issues:
1999–2005/Structured
Finance International
Magazine (Euromoney Inst.
Investor Plc.)
Rating (−), LTV (−),
geographical and market
dummies, time dummies,
collateral dummies,
currency risk (+), external
enhancement (−), maturity
(+), collateral type
Vink and Thibeault
(2008b)
non-US ABS (765), MBS
(760) and CDO (514)
issues:
1999–2005/Structured
Finance International
Magazine (Euromoney
Institutional Investor Plc.)
Rating (−), LTV (−),issue
type (ABS, MBS, CDO),
geographical and market
dummies, time dummies,
collateral dummies,
currency risk (+), credit
enhancement (+), external
enhancement (−), maturity
(+), collateral type, loans
size (+), originator type
(bank, corporate, ﬁnance
house, insurance company,
public entity, sovereign),
number of ratings (−),
ﬁxed interest rate loans (+),
currency risk (+)
Vink and Fabozzi
(2009)
Non-US ABS (186 issues):
1999–2006/Structured
Finance International
Magazine (Euromoney Inst.
Inv. Plc.)
Rating (−), external
enhancement (−),
geographical origin of the
loans, originator default
risk (+), nature of assets
Franke and Weber
(2009)
European CDO (169):
1997–2005/Moody’s Bank
Scope
Number or tranches (−),
number of subordinated
tranches (−)
Gorton and Metrick
(2012)
US and non-US asset
classes and others:
2007–2008/Dealers banks
(Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch and Bear
Stearns)
LIBOR-OIS (overnight index
swap): interbank minus
conﬁdence (+), Interbank
market haircut (+), rating
(−), collateral dummies,
issue type
Pen˜a-Cerezo et al.
(2014)
Spanish MBS (94):
1996–2011/CNMV
Number of tranches (−),
subordinated tranches
weight (+), rating (−), time
dummies, risk free interest
rate (+)
+/−: the variable has a positive/negative and relevant inﬂuence on securitizationM.Á. Pen˜a-Cerezo et al. / European Research on M
As regards the multitranche structuring, it is considered an
ffective measure to increase the rating of speciﬁc tranches of
onds because, as has already been indicated, it is possible to use
hat mechanism to resize the risk assumed by those tranches. The
ign of the expected relation between the number of tranches
nd the primary yield of the bonds (particularly in the senior
ranches) is negative, while the strategy to create tranches with
ifferentiated risk and yield characteristics is assumed to be effec-
ive and, therefore, to create value. The empirical studies usually
lso include other indicative variables of the multitranche struc-
uring, such as the size of the tranches, the order of precedence of
ach tranche, the tranches retained, and theweight of certain types
f tranches.
Furthermore, theoriginators and themanagers of the securitiza-
ion funds have a potential wide battery of external tools for credit
nhancement – that is, granted by ﬁnancial entities outside the
riginator of the credits granted to the fund-, aimed at improving
he levels of liquidity, risk, etc. perceived by the potential investors.
pecial mention should be made of surety guarantee. A negative
elation is, then, expected between surety granting and the yield
ffered by the guaranteed bonds.
The term or the maturity of securitization bonds is likewise
ariables that are frequently included in this type of analysis (Firla-
uchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson, 2006; Vink & Thibeault,
008a, 2008b). The expected sign of the relation between thematu-
ity and the yield premium is positive, given that the rational aspect
n a scenario with a temporary structure of rising interest rates is
hat the longer the maturity of the ﬁnancial assets, the greater the
ield they offer. In any event, the inﬂuence of the maturity both on
he yield of the senior bonds and on the average yield of the issue
s clearly conditioned by the type of credit given – mortgage, com-
any, consumer, etc.–, given their different terms. In this regard,
he maturity will have an explanatory capacity if the representa-
ive variables of the type of assets transferred have not discounted
he information relating to their maturity.
Different studies (Firla-Cuchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson,
006; Vink& Fabozzi, 2009; Vink&Thibeault, 2008a) have included
ime control variables. On the one hand, the introductory stage of
his mode of ﬁnancing on each market is usually considered, as it
s expected that during that stage, the market requires an extraor-
inary yield as a result of the relative complexity of the product
nd the lack of knowledge of it by the investors. On the other hand,
or the studies that include the subprime crisis and the subsequent
eriod, it cannot be ignored that that crisis has generated nega-
ive effects on the appraisal and perception of the risk of those
ssets, such as the lack of conﬁdence of the investors in the rat-
ng awarded by the rating agencies or the lack of liquidity on the
ecuritization markets. These circumstances have had a signiﬁ-
ant effect on the premiums required for the securitization bonds.
herefore, the expected effect on the yield of the bonds is positive
n both cases (“adaptation” and “crisis”).
As regards the speciﬁc variables of the ﬁnancial markets more
idely used in the literature to contextualise the behaviour of the
rimary yield of the securitization bonds, the level of the interest
ates of the market should be noted. In this regard, either because
he government bonds and the majority of the securitization issues
those that have an AAA rating or equivalent to the sovereign risk)
an be considered to be substitute ﬁnancial products, or because
he yield on the government bonds is a benchmark for the ﬁxed
ield issues overall of a country, a signiﬁcant and positive relation
as to be supposed between this variable and the primary yield of
he securitization issues.When summarising the results obtained in the empirical
tudies (Table 2), a signiﬁcant andnegative inﬂuence of the number
f tranches on the yield can be seen, thus defending the effec-
iveness of generating multitranche structure to reduce the yieldbond yield.
offered by the senior tranches – “weak” effectiveness (Franke &
Weber, 2009; Pen˜a-Cerezo et al., 2014), and even, by the issue over-
all – “strong” effectiveness – (Pen˜a-Cerezo et al., 2014). In turn, it
can also be seen that the size of the issue negatively inﬂuences
the yield premium (Firla-Cuchra, 2005; Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson,
2006; Pen˜a-Cerezo et al., 2014; Schaber, 2008), either due to the
greater diversiﬁcation of the risks in larger asset pools, or because
of the lower liquidity premium required of these issues. Other vari-
ables such as the average rating awarded to the issue, the yield of
the no-risk asset (Pen˜a-Cerezo et al., 2014; Schaber, 2008; Vink
& Thibeault, 2008b), the number of agencies that rate the issue
(Pen˜a-Cerezo et al., 2013; Vink&Thibeault, 2008b), the existence of
credit enhancements (Schaber, 2008; Vink & Fabozzi, 2009; Vink &
Thibeault, 2008a, 2008b) or the maturity (Vink & Thibeault, 2008a,
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008b) also have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the yield of the securi-
ization issues, in the meaning expected by the literature.
. Conclusions
The capacity of securitization to generate ﬁxed yield securities
ith the maximum rating and, consequently, with a very low risk
remium are among the factors that justify the extensive use of the
echanism, particularly in the period prior to the subprime crisis.
hen reviewing the literature linked to the explanatory factors of
ield offered by the securitization issues, a characteristic element
f ﬁnancial securitization emerges: the possibility that it offers to
referably generate securities with maximum ratings, by means of
ividing the bond issues into different tranches, with a determined
rder of precedence.
The effectiveness of generating multiple tranches in the reduc-
ion of the risk premium linked to securitization issues can be taken
t two levels.On theonehand, the “weakeffectiveness” concept can
e present if a large number of tranches is related to a lower risk
remium sought for senior or AAA tranches. On the other hand, for
greater strictness of requirements, we would deﬁne the “strong
ffectiveness” if a large number of tranches help to reduce the yield
ought from the bonds issued overall. Both effects have been found,
ven though the second of them less frequently, in the securitiza-
ion issues.
In addition, the generation of multiple tranches can also
elp to solve the serious asymmetric information problems asso-
iated to ﬁnancial securitization. However, the review of the
mpirical papers in that regards shows a stronger link of the mul-
itranche structure to the reduction of the moral hazard problems
han those associated to adverse selection.
To conclude, we consider that more comprehensive empiri-
al studies (including a greater number of securitization types, a
reaternumberofmarkets, anda longer time line) shouldbecarried
ut that will allow to verify in a more integral and global manner
he validity of the theoretical approaches set out here, by observ-
ng thedifferences thatmayexist on thedifferent ﬁnancialmarkets,
ccording to thedifferent degree of complexity of the securitization
tructures used or the existing legislative differences.
In any event, despite the criticism of this mechanism as the
ossible trigger of the subprime crisis, we believe that, with appro-
riate regulation and supervision, it will continue to be a useful
nstrument, particularly for ﬁnancial entities, to obtain ﬁnancing in
ttractive conditions.
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